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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the inter-regional security cooperation between ASEAN 
and the EU with a specific focus on counterterrorism. The research methods are 
based on a comparison of regional counterterrorism governance between the two 
regions and a close reading of Plan of Actions for the enhancement of ASEAN-EU 
relations documents from 2007 to 2018. The results show that CT cooperation is 
about facilitating a more comprehensive security governance cooperation where 
European standards and experience are transferred to Southeast Asia for purposes 
of regional security and diplomatic relations. In addition, this research also shows 
that EU-ASEAN CT cooperation has not been geared specifically to combat 
radicalism, or as part of a Counter Violent Extremism program; rather, the inter-
regional cooperation has mainly focused on building a common normative 
framework in responding to terrorism within the corridor of democracy and 
preempting the terrorist networks from exploiting connectivity networks. Finally, 
implementation of security and political cooperation between the EU and ASEAN 
tend to rely on the existing extra-regional dialogue fora within ASEAN as well as 
direct engagement between the EU and third parties comprising each of the ASEAN 
states. 
Keywords: Regional Securitization, Functionalism, Inter-regionalism, 
Counterterrorism, ASEAN, EU 
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INTRODUCTION 
International cooperation in counterterrorism (CT) is an increasingly important subject 
of international security studies. The changing nature of terrorism takes place as terrorist 
networks acquire a capacity to create propaganda and attacks with global impacts with cheaper 
budgets (Goldman, 2011). Ideologies that drive violence extremism in one corner of the globe 
may become the driver of acts of terrorism in another (Klein, 2006). Ideological drive that 
originally mobilizes puritan Sunni Muslims against Shia in Syria and Iraq could serve as the 
ideological driver for terrorist cells in countries where Sunni-Shia friction is almost unknown 
such as Indonesia (Chalmers, 2017). In addition to a more global-orientation in ideological 
affiliation, today’s terrorism-financing is increasingly cross-border in nature. It has long been 
the case for organizations like ISIS to acquire a network of charity donations in Indonesia, for 
example, that provide the organization with a capability to provide social support for its 
sympathizers as well as operational capital (Arianti et al., 2019). The introduction of electronic 
wiring of money, social media and chat applications, and digital currencies expanded the 
transnational traffic of terrorism financing even further, depending on the need of the 
organizations (Carroll & Windle, 2018). Recruitment and operations of terrorist activities have 
also taken place in a cross-border manner as foreign terrorist organizations have become 
capable of maintaining local contacts to transfer funds internationally and replenish their 
manpower with volunteering foreign terrorist fighters. 
ASEAN-EU's CT cooperation is part of the ongoing interregional dialogue that has 
been undertaken since the late 1990's in the effort of the two regions to respond to critical 
challenges to human and national security due to globalization. Documents of interregional 
engagements between the EU and ASEAN from the late 1990s have already shown an 
agreement that globalization brought new challenges, and, in that respect, more multilateral 
cooperation is needed. Issues of terrorism, transnational crime (with emphasis on trafficking of 
illegal drugs), WMD proliferation, environmental degradation, and natural disasters were 
identified in the late 1990's by both ASEAN and the EU as common threats or challenges. 
Against this background, CT cooperation between Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and European Union (EU) – initiated by the EU - has taken place since 2003 and 
continued to take place at the time of writing. Plan of actions for the cooperation has been 
renewed every five years, and both the EU and ASEAN never seem to degrade their 
prioritization towards the cooperative mechanism (Hwee, 2017).  
This research argues that observation of EU-ASEAN allows one to understand how two 
regions that are entirely different in their regional governance continue their security 
cooperation due to different objectives of the respective regions. As an EU’s initiative, CT 
cooperation with ASEAN as an institution and with member-states serves the purposes of intra-
regional security as well as maintaining diplomatic proximity in the face of geopolitical 
tension. This research finds that the interregional CT cooperation between the EU and ASEAN 
utilizes the existing institutional framework for extra-regional cooperation within ASEAN, 
rather than creating a new institutional mechanism. Thus, the interregional engagements of the 
two regions not only nurtures CT cooperation but also strengthens multilateral institutions that 
have been formed by ASEAN countries, rather than imposes a new institution. Secondly, this 
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research finds that the nature of CT cooperation between ASEAN and the EU does not touch 
on the need for capacity-building in deradicalization. This may well due to differing identity 
issues of the respective regions that give birth to the problem of radicalism in the first place. In 
Furthermore, both the EU and ASEAN have been limited in their respective regional 
governances of CT by the supremacy of national CT policies. The EU externalizes CT towards 
outside their region to help strengthen its CT role and maintain Europe’s international presence 
Southeast Asia and global CT governance. At the same time, ASEAN pursues a cooperative 
engagement in CT for purposes of sustainable capacity-building in the future. 
This research explores the theoretical framework explaining the required fundamentals 
for sustainable inter-regional cooperation on the security sector, and analyses individually the 
regional governance of CT in the EU and ASEAN. In addition, this research dwells on the 
details of the Plans of Actions concluded by ASEAN and the EU on matters pertaining to CT 
and resulting cooperative mechanisms between the two regions. This research might as well 
provide conclusion on the entire EU-ASEAN CT cooperation as an EU-initiated, non-
hierarchical, asymmetric yet mutually beneficial cooperative mechanism. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The growing literature on interregional relations suggest that the functions performed 
by existing interregional relations have the potential of establishing a critical component for an 
emerging, both horizontally and vertically differentiated, and multi-layered global "governance 
architecture" (Rüland, 2014). However, the optimism towards this direction is guarded by the 
decreasing expectations that interregional relationship could drive the growth of collective 
identity-building given that regions are in their cultural or identitarian blocs, leading to cultural 
barriers in interregional cooperation (Santini, Lucarelli & Pinfari, 2014). In this regard, 
interregional cooperation is realistically evaluated not in terms of ideational convergence but 
rather in terms of values in the management of common concerns, including forced migration, 
transnational organized crime, and mitigation of climate change consequences. 
How does inter-regional cooperation possible to take place? First, two regions may 
consolidate some level of security cooperation when each of these regions is consolidated under 
a regional organization or governance. Without some level of regional governance, values and 
interests for each region will be difficult to recognize for an extra-regional actor. A presence 
of regional governance also determines the level of impact that can be expected; there is a need 
for the regions in question to acquire security governance of their own in order for them to 
engage productively in interregional security cooperation. What logically follows from the 
presence of regional governance is that there must be some degree of institutionalization of 
governance over the issue of security under cooperation. To be sure, it is not the suggestion 
here that two engaging regions must have their norms and institutionalization level 
symmetrical; rather, issues under cooperation must be part of security agenda in both regions 
and that the need for a stronger regional response is present in both regions. (Emmers, Greener 
& Thomas, 2006). 
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Secondly, for two regions to engage productively, a similar actorness characteristics 
must be agreed upon by the two regions; whether the interregional engagement is geared 
towards balancing, institution-building, agenda-setting (of new themes or agendas of 
cooperation) and/or collective-identity building (Thayer, 2007). The consensus for either one 
of the choices helps identify opportunities and challenges that interregional engagements create 
for different actors in different sectors of cooperation.  
Finally, some symmetry in the threat perception towards the same issue would help 
establish more robust security cooperation between two or more regional governances. 
Securitization of the issue under cooperation should have already taken place, although the 
impact may differ between regions. As the cooperating regions already categorize the issue as 
security, i.e. pertinent to the survival of the region, there is a construction of common 
perception and treatment of the issue as security threat. The regional governances thus 
recognize the need to produce a certain policy-measure based on a collectively-endorsed 
urgency to treat a particular issue with an extraordinary measure(s) (Stritzel, 2007). This means 
that different regions securitizing the issue may well come up with different measures and 
policy preferences. What matters is for both regions to formulate cooperative mechanisms to 
ensure sustainable dialogue and cooperation on the issue. 
The next theoretical question would be: How should one assess the accomplishment of 
interregional cooperation? The deepening of interregional engagements is indicated by cross-
regional norm-convergence, generating 'division of labor' among participants in global security 
governance (Acharya, 2003). Processes of norm-convergence and division of labor in 
interregional cooperation supplement identity-building process as member regions identify 
themselves with common framework in responding to issues (Soriano, 2019). Norm 
convergence process is the product of the work of stakeholders of security governance on 
multiple levels (national, sub-regional, regional, trans-regional and interregional) in improving 
coordination to cope with or overcome issues of global security agenda (Kirchner and 
Dominguez, 2014). In explaining to what extent interregionalism establishes security 
governance that in turn reframes security cooperation requires one to analyze how actors at 
national, regional, cross-regional and global levels shape the processes that supplement 
identity-building process of regionalism through the creation of norm convergence across 
regions The latter’s activities include building consensus on the nature and sources of security 
problems, formulating plans of actions and policies to ameliorate security problems, engaging 
in actual management of these problems, and evaluation of the performance of security 
practitioners (Afoaku, 2012; Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl, 2014; He, 2019). 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The research is a qualitative exploratory study that examines the characteristics of 
ASEAN and EU counter-terrorism cooperation from the gathered secondary data. This 
secondary data includes the Plan of Action documents between the European Union and 
ASEAN produced from 2007 to 2018 as references to find out the scope of cooperation and 
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various documents from open sources to explain the five areas of cooperation, namely 
intelligence, law enforcement, justice, borders and transport, and financing of terrorism. 
Websites of ASEAN.org and eucyberdirect.eu are particularly utilized to gather documents on 
ASEAN-EU Plan of Action.  
The analysis involves a scrutiny of keywords that are relevant to CT, including 
“security and political cooperation”, “non-traditional security”, “transnational crime” and 
“enforcement mechanisms”. The Plan of Action documents are descriptive and prescriptive in 
nature, containing commonly agreed framework in EU’s relations with third parties and list of 
policies that both the EU and ASEAN are cooperating. The Plan of Action documents are then 
compared with the regional counter-terrorism governance of the EU and ASEAN to measure 
the congruency of counter-terrorism cooperation schemes from the respective regions. The 
analysis of Plan of Action documents is complemented with other public available sources, 
including data and reports published by ASEANAPOL, Europol, and UN’s Security Council 
Counterterrorism Committee.  
The theoretical framework in this research is a result of a distillation of main insights 
of the literature on EU’s engagements in Southeast Asia, EU’s, and ASEAN’s regional counter-
terrorism governance. They also provide additional data on the scope and depth of operational 
aspects of counter-terrorism cooperation. These texts also provide the categorization of 
counter-terrorism cooperation, including police cooperation, judicial cooperation, intelligence 
cooperation, migration and border management, and cooperation in combating terrorist 
financing. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Institutionalization of CT governance in ASEAN and the EU 
The similarity between Europe and Southeast Asia’s threat perceptions has driven both 
regions to establish inter-regional cooperation. Nevertheless, the regional securitizations in 
both regions have resulted in different outcomes. Europe’s perception of terrorism, which is 
mainly formed by the wake of 9/11, has compromised the region’s inclusivity towards people 
of different backgrounds, including migrants who reside in Europe. On the other hand, for 
Southeast Asia, the issue of terrorism threatens the credibility of the region as a stable and safe 
environment for investments, trades and global transportation routes for goods and services. 
For the EU, any form of regional governance must take shape as a governing entity that makes 
decisions on behalf of all member states. Meanwhile, ASEAN seeks to build a normative 
architecture that gradually brings member-states’ to have an internationally recognizable form 
of CT policy.  
 
Regional CT Governance in ASEAN 
ASEAN’s intra-regional cooperation in CT is a largely post-9/11 phenomenon, and it 
has so far comprised of mutual understanding and capacity-building efforts. The first formal 
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emergence of terrorism issue in ASEAN is represented by the 1997 Declaration on 
Transnational Crime, which treated terrorism as transnational crime instead of extraordinary 
crime or defence issue and publicized member-states general commitment to cooperate in 
responding to transnational crime rather than terrorism specifically. This declaration was then 
followed by two additions in 1998, which are the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime and the Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of 
Transnational Crime (Gunaratna, 2017). Taken together, these documents do not represent any 
kind of regional decisions, rules, or particular initiatives. They are rather limited to a “collective 
acknowledgement of terrorism as a transnational phenomenon.” (Borelli, 2017). This 
conception of terrorism changed after the first Bali Bombings on October 2002; the latter is 
another watershed event specific to the region as the tragic terrorist attack turned ASEAN’s 
titular leader Indonesia from a critical voice against American-led global war on terrorism to 
an integral part of world’s CT agenda. 
After the 9/11, ASEAN member-states re-framed the definition of terrorism acts, 
particularly ones that came from an Islamic background—in which many transnational crimes 
were reclassified into terrorism (Singh, 2009). To create right-based CT that still adheres to 
states’ security policy, ASEAN countries need legitimacy and capacity building to provide 
objective feedbacks on their practices. Currently, the priority for ASEAN member-states is to 
retain their independence and non-interference norms in formulating their CT policies (Sukma, 
2012) Compared to the EU, ASEAN’s institutional building on CT is more complacent; 
specifically, it is not engineered to perform an enforcement mechanism of agreements and 
initiatives. ASEAN aims, at least initially, to produce a common framework of action in the 
conduct of CT cooperation (Tan & Nasu, 2016)..  This common framework is embodied in the 
ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), which was produced in 2007 but came 
into force in 2011 after six member states ratified it. The ACCT was finally ratified by all 
members in 2013. The length with which the ACCT undertook to achieve full ratification 
testifies to the gradual character of enforcement mechanism and the tradition of ASEAN to 
implement regional initiatives at a pace comfortable to all member-states (Emmers, 2009). By 
implication, harmonization of national CT agendas is nearly absent on the regional level as 
national governments’ CT policies follow their priorities in terms of national stability and 
combating dissidents (Gunaratna, 2017).  
The road to the 2007 ACCT was paved with several regional conventions aimed at 
gradually shaping the normative architecture of regional response to terrorism. The first one 
was the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (ADJACT) in 2001. 
ADJACT signifies the region's response to terrorism as an abhorred method of pursuing 
political objectives, thus responding to the perception of Southeast Asian Muslims that global 
war on terrorism was a camouflaged war on Islam. It also took ownership of terrorism as an 
issue that had significant ramifications for the region, despite the fact that global war on terror 
was an American-led agenda. In addition, the declaration put United Nations multilateral 
framework and extra-regional cooperation as primary references in the conduct of international 
CT. 
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Following the 2002 Bali bombings, ASEAN pursued a number of joint declarations 
with external dialogue partners, including the U.S., the EU, Australia, India, Russia, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan and Canada. With the People's Republic of China, 
CT becomes a part of larger cooperation on Non-Traditional Security which is embodied and 
renewed periodically in Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of 
Non-Traditional Security Issues (Wibisono, 2017). In addition, intra-mural cooperation 
between member-states with sponsorship from extra-regional actors – particularly the U.S. and 
Australia – also characterized CT cooperation in the region. Another ASEAN-led initiative on 
CT that paved the groundwork to the adoption of ACCT in 2007 was the Treaty on Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT), adopted on 29 November 2004. MLAT was 
aimed at institutionalizing regional efforts at legal assistance and criminal investigation and 
prosecution. 
The 2007 ACCT, as stipulated under article IX(1), mandates the member states – when 
they see it appropriate – to conduct national legislation to ensure that offences covered in the 
Convention’s article II are no longer justifiable, either politically, philosophically, 
ideologically, racially, ethnically, religiously, or other means of interpretations, “especially 
when it is intended to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (ASEAN, 2007). This provision excludes 
the consideration of motivation, but at the same time includes the consideration of the intent of 
an act (to intimidate a population, etc.), thereby preventing the politicization of investigation 
and trials, which would hamper an effort to uncover the whole terrorist network. ACCT is a 
legally-binding instrument that facilitates CT cooperation of member-states in terms of 
information-sharing and capacity-building, as well as a wider scope of prosecution, prevention 
and suppression of terrorism. Further regulations of CT are embodied in the 2009 
Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism, meant to provide substance to the 2007 
ACCT. The action plan outlines an adherence to relevant UN security council resolutions, a 
mechanism for intelligence exchange, tracking and interdiction of suspected terrorists, and 
addressing the root causes of terrorism.  
Capacity-building is another achievement that ASEAN-centred extra-regional 
cooperation managed to accomplish in regard to CT. A number of joint-training and tabletop 
exercises are conducted not just for CT capacity building but also humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief efforts between militaries (Zimmerman, 2014). The ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) has notably established Inter-sessional Support Group for the issues of maritime security 
(disaster relief), humanitarian assistance, transnational crime, and terrorism. Meanwhile, the 
ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus has organized table-top exercise and CT 
exercise in 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
As a result of the promulgation of the 2007 ACCT and its plan of action, the national 
responses of member-states to terrorism are complemented with provisions that strengthen their 
capacity to respond to transnational characters of terrorism. ACCT provisions are important in 
alleviating the limits of national frameworks of CT, which are based on national experiences 
in dealing insurgencies and national subversive movements in respective member states. 
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Regional CT in the EU 
The EU’s CT cooperation with external parties signified by EU’s aspiration to 
disseminate their internal security governance. The EU also realized that its internal security is 
indivisible from the external security dimension since the nature of terrorism has been 
increasingly transnational in the last decades, particularly due to how non-state actors are 
involved in planning a domestic attack.  EU’s concern on this matter appear in “A Strategy for 
External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice,” a document published in 
2005. The document also mentions the 2002 Bali Bomb Tragedy as a reference to boost the 
cooperation between the EU and Southeast Asia (Cross, 2017). 
CT Regionalism in EU was driven by The Madrid Terrorist Attack in 2004, in which 
the accident resulted in the formation of EU CT Council. The CTC is under the direct 
supervision of the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy rather than the 
Justice of Home-Affairs, the institution that formulated the EU’s CT criminal justice-oriented 
approach. Such placement specifies that CTC is designed as the key to conduct EU’s extra-
regional security cooperation.  
Intra-mural role of the CTC is in cajoling member states to make sure a timely 
implementation of EU-level CT agreements. However, it can be said that member-states’ 
authorities and independence in pursuing their own national agendas in CT are maintained. 
This is the case because the CTC cannot force member-states into taking particular actions, it 
has no independent budget, no authority to propose legislation or to chair meetings with Justice, 
Interior or Foreign ministers to set up EU’s CT agenda (Kaunert, 2009). Not to mention the CT 
sector is already crowded with existing EU and non-EU structures and agencies. 
The relation between CTC and EU member states is not determinative, instead, it is 
consultative in nature. The main purpose of CTC is to conduct assessment on member states’ 
compliance to the EU’s Counter Terrorism Action Plan. Even though there is no hierarchy 
between CTC and EU member states, collaborations between parties still take place (Ragazzi 
& Walmsley, 2018). As stipulated by Mackenzie et al. (2013), CTC’s tasks comprise of 
coordination of CT work (including multiple working groups and working parties) with Justice 
and Home Affairs, an overview of relevant EU instruments for CT, effective executions of 
Council decisions, oversight of the implementation of EU CT strategy and its report to the 
council, sustaining communication between the EU and third countries, and active role 
maintenance of CT as a whole  (Mackenzie et al., 2013). The last two tasks mentioned comprise 
of roles that the CTC plays in regard to EU’s CT cooperation with third countries. 
In regards of the second function, CTC has been actively promoting political dialogue 
on the issue of CT in international level and endorsing numerous initiatives, both practically 
and technically. Even though CTC does not have the capacity to ratified agreement or initiate 
project with third countries, the CTC ensures the EU’s active role in combating terrorism 
through a broad range of activities.  
For example, in terms of practical actions, in 2011 the EU CTS conduct a discussion 
on CT with Russia and India on CT. On the same year, it is also involved in other multilateral 
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forums such as Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) and UN Conference in Riyadh. This fact 
signifies that the EU CTC has increasingly become a major actor in publicizing EU CT 
practices in international stages. Therefore, although the extent EU’s CT cooperation with 
some of these third countries is still limited, it appears that the third countries’ authority have 
acknowledged the significance of the EU CTC and are willing to interact with CTC on a regular 
basis. The recognition by third countries become one of the reasons on why CTC is an 
important part of the EU external CT. 
The EU has been attempting to externalize its CT policy in order to reduce the risk of 
foreign-perpetrated domestic terrorism. The assumption behind this strategy is to prevent the 
danger of terrorism to reach the EU citizens by strengthening the competency of third countries 
in dealing with terrorism (Argomaniz, Bures & Kaunert, 2015). Based on this objective, the 
EU’s extra-regional CT is driven by its needs to build external governance, specifically by 
transferring EU’s standard and capacity in CT to third countries and international institutions 
(Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). Simply put, the EU achieved security through governance 
transfer rather than the use of deterrence and alliance. EU’s externalization—or transfer of 
standards and capacity—however, cannot be conducted in a hierarchical manner. This is also 
applied to CT arrangements that are implemented under Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); in 
which JHA only plays a coordinating role since the issue’s locus is located within the 
jurisdiction of member countries. 
In the wake of ISIS in 2011, the EU’s response to terrorism was to strengthen its 
regional boundaries and establish itself as a manager of cooperation in CT with the extra-
regional entities (Cross, 2017). The EU was striving to address conflicts that resulted from the 
increasing level of radicalization and the rise of far-right political movements.  However, the 
threat posed by ISIS is unlike that posed by Al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11 due to the co-existing 
challenge of nationalist backlash and a wave of migration from Syria and Iraq. This occurs 
because blaming the migrants for terrorism is contradictive with EU's values of openness and 
inclusion, and the EU needs to divert the solution and public attention towards responding to 
terrorism as part of externally oriented and foreign policy matter, away from internal causes of 
the terrorism threat. 
In addition to securing its own populace, the EU’s CT cooperation can also be perceived 
as part of the region’s maintenance of presence in Southeast Asia through Non-Traditional 
Security cooperation. Europe and Southeast Asia shared a similar conception of non-traditional 
security (NTS) in which terrorism is part of its issues (Martel, 2016). For example, ASEAN-
EU Plan of Action 2018-2022 stipulated the plans for cooperation between ASEAN and 
European Union to combat terrorism under the heading of “combating terrorism, transnational 
crimes, and addressing other non-traditional security (NTS) issues.” Non-traditional security 
issues comprise of security issues that are usually posed by non-state actors and requires 
responses that are beyond mere use of force; non-traditional security is associated with the 
provision of security through use of force, justice reform, development of human resources and 
infrastructure (Wibisono, 2017). There are two reasons why terrorism is categorized as part of 
NTS agenda in Europe-Southeast Asia CT cooperation. First, for both Europe and Southeast 
Asia NTS represents the security concept that perceives insecurities and risks as stemming 
70  EU-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Cooperation 
 
from social, economic and justice matters; such security conceptualization fits within Southeast 
Asia’s preference for national and regional resilience and Europe’s preference for security 
cooperation instead of alliance-building. Secondly, Europe and Southeast Asia both required 
“a low-key rhetorical framing of force projection which also taps into sensitive security areas” 
which the NTS concept provided (Maier-Knapp, 2015). 
By placing terrorism under the rubric of NTS, ASEAN and the EU conducted CT not 
just for the purpose of tackling the issue but also to expand their interaction along with political 
and security parameters (Dosch & Maier-Knapp, 2017). The employment of NTS by the EU 
and its member states is meant to facilitate closer engagement with ASEAN as there is an 
enduring reliance of Southeast Asian states on the European market. On the other hand, some 
authors have highlighted the need for the EU to maintain close attention to geopolitical tensions 
in the Asia Pacific; therefore, the EU seeks to utilize existing defense and economic diplomacy 
processes where ASEAN sits at their centers. Enhanced regulatory community-building 
processes allow Southeast Asian countries in attracting external partners on political matters of 
the region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministerial 
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Maier-Knapp, 2015). 
Because of the need to centralize diplomacy with the presence of the use of force as capacity-
building, confidence-building and deterrence, ASEAN and EU's CT cooperation utilized the 
multilateral fora that have so far facilitated ASEAN and extra-regional powers to discuss 
pertinent security issues. 
 
Functionalist Analysis of EU-ASEAN CT Cooperation 
Before the initiation of CT cooperation or any form of security dialogue, the EU and 
ASEAN has long maintained a dialogue forum since its first formalization in 1977. Recognition 
for a shared commitment has been presented to achieve regional integration as means to 
improve regional stability and prosperity, as well as responding to global challenges. However, 
the long-term visions and the commitment to achieve common goals and objectives are not 
formally inscribed until 2007 with the Nuremberg Declaration on Enhanced Partnership, and 
formal diplomatic relations need to wait until after the adoption of ASEAN Charter in 2008. 
The EU finally began to deploy a Diplomatic Mission to members of ASEAN in 2015. The 
EU-ASEAN relationship has been at the centre of interregionalism studies; studies of 
interregional cooperation have suggested that EU's effort at increasing their presence in 
international scenes is pursued by engaging with Southeast Asia both politically and 
economically while balancing when possible to burgeoning influence of the United States and 
China in the region. The EU also attempted to build the mirror-image of its governance 
principles in the region. On the other hand, ASEAN also has grown into an increasingly 
relevant organization although its "actorness" often comes into question. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that ASEAN adheres to norms of respect to sovereignty of member states and non-
interference, which do not always align with the way regional governance is conducted in the 
EU. 
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The observation on CT governance in the EU and ASEAN on the previous section notes 
that both regional governances lack a capability to exert determinative role over their respective 
members’ CT policies. The issue of terrorism is governed tightly by national governments, but 
both the EU and ASEAN are tasked with maintaining an international profile by their member 
states. For the EU, this international profile is part of securing its own region through 
strengthening the capacity of third countries; while for ASEAN, an international stage is 
important to signify their principles of multilateralism in CT cooperation as well as capacity 
building purposes. 
During the first half of the 2000s, ASEAN-EU interregional forums extended their 
attempts since 1997 to respond security challenges emerging from globalization concerning 
human security, transnational organized crime, and terrorism. The volume of interregional 
forums on security governance somewhat decreased during this period due to Southeast Asia's 
recuperation from the 1997 financial crisis, but only to increase to a higher level compared to 
1997 during the second half of the 2000s. In particular, the first half of 2000s saw the 
inauguration of formal CT cooperation agreements between ASEAN and the EU, which started 
with the Joint Declaration to Combat Terrorism in 2003. It embodied the intention for a sharing 
of experiences and good practices between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies of the 
regions. The declaration also affirmed ASEAN and the EU's long-time commitment to abide 
by the rulings of the United Nations by referring to terrorism definition stipulated in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373 and acknowledging the centrality of the UN Charter, the 
norms of international law and respect for human rights and humanitarian law (European 
Union, 2003). 
The substance of the joint declaration is further elaborated in the EU’s ASEAN strategy 
paper which presented six priority strategies for EU’s engagement with ASEAN, including 
support for stability and CT policies in Southeast Asia, poverty reduction, EU-ASEAN 
economic relations and respect for human rights, democracy and good governance, and 
mainstreaming the role of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs (Mattheis & Wunderlich, 2017). 
The way in which CT cooperation is accompanied by other aspects of human security and good 
governance affirms the principle of comprehensive security that both regions adhere to security 
should be approached from a pluralist point of view incorporating political, social, economic 
and human dimensions (Kim, 1999). 
During the second half of 2000s, the agenda of CT cooperation continues to exist among 
the expanding issues of comprehensive security as the latter broadens to include new categories 
such as communicable diseases and pandemics, sea piracy and cyber security. The concept of 
non-traditional security also began to enter EU-ASEAN security dialogue's lexicon. Non-
Traditional Security also appeared in other security governance involving ASEAN, including 
ASEAN Political and Security Community, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three 
(with South Korea, Japan and China) and East Asia Summit. It can be suggested here that the 
inclusion of Non-Traditional Security concept in EU-ASEAN security dialogue forums is due 
to the congruence of adherence to comprehensive security between epistemic community and 
governments in ASEAN and the EU, because other interregional dialogues involving ASEAN 
states and the EU do not incorporate Non-Traditional Security.  
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The implication of Non-Traditional Security inclusion to CT cooperation appears in the 
Plan of Action (PoA) for the “Enhancement of ASEAN-EU Relations and Cooperation 
between 2007-2012” where CT cooperation–with emphasis on addressing terrorist financing–
is stipulated as part of political and security cooperation, together with cooperation on 
addressing the trafficking in persons, drugs, small arms and light weapons, and money 
laundering. Similarly, the 2013-2017 PoA also placed CT cooperation together with human 
rights crisis mitigation, civilian crisis management, and illegal drug trafficking suppression.  
While none of the joint activities agreed upon in the 2007-2012 and 2013-2017 PoAs 
shows specific policy measures, both plans of actions show a strong drive to establish cross-
regional frame of security governance. This latter aspect also comes into prominence as 
ASEAN Charter which established ASEAN Community entered into effect in 2008 and 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area formation also began taking place (Koh, Manalo & Woon, 
2009). Maintaining itself as a formidable partner in a newly established ASEAN Community 
within the limits of UN-approved frameworks, the EU made sure that wordings of the PoA 
supported Southeast Asia’s regionalism as well as normative resonance with the EU. This 
partly explains the comprehensiveness of the 2007-2012 PoA which details the EU's strategic 
priorities in political and security, socio-cultural, economic, energy security and climate change 
and development cooperation. CT cooperation falls under the sub-heading of "traditional and 
non-traditional issues" within political and security cooperation (ASEAN, 2013). At the same 
time, EU-ASEAN interregionalism is further institutionalized in the “Nuremberg Declaration 
on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership” in March 2007. 
EU-ASEAN CT cooperation also contributed to Southeast Asian states’ ownership of 
their terrorism problems through the utilization of centres based in member-states’ capital city 
to conduct the mandate of cooperation. This is shown by the 2013-2017 ASEAN-EU PoA 
which designates International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, the South East 
Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta 
Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) as units that receive the EU’s CT support 
in judicial capacity building and anti-money laundering operation. Highly relevant with the 
need to conduct effective CT, the 2013-2017 PoA also initiated Comprehensive Border 
Management Program where the EU supports ASEAN member states’ border management. 
Regular policy dialogue on CT is stipulated to be conducted through ASEAN-EU Senior 
Officials Meeting (SOM) and ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), while ASEAN 
Secretariat assists in reviewing the progress of implementation of the results of this dialogue.  
ASEAN Regional Forum also serves as a hub for formulation of workplan that 
implements the 2013-2017 PoA in 2014, it issued the ARF Work Plan on Counter-terrorism 
and Transnational Crime (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2017) focusing on priority areas of cyber 
security, illicit drugs suppression, mitigation of the use of chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear (CBRN) by subversive actors, counter-radicalization or alternative narratives 
against extremist ideologies; anti-terrorism financing; and involuntary trafficking of persons. 
ARF also supported wider non-traditional security exercises that serve both capacity building 
as well as trust building among participating states, including Multilateral Tabletop or Field 
Exercises, Voluntary Training Courses, Capacity-Building Workshops, and ARF Pilot Projects 
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(Zimmerman, 2014). ARF workplan takes the ASEAN-CT cooperation closer to the Counter 
Violent-Extremism (CVE) aspect of CT as it aims to empower participants in sabotaging 
terrorists’ attempts at exploiting connectivity network and freedom of information to propagate 
their views (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2017). 
A specific section dedicated for combatting terrorism finally appeared in the most 
recent Plan of Action of EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation for the period of 2018-2022. 
The 2018-2022 PoA explicitly mentioned the concept of violent extremism as it drives EU-
ASEAN CT cooperation to implement the ACCT and ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action 
on Counter-Terrorism in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, encourages 
sharing of best practices between EUROPOL and ASEANAPOL in addressing CVE works. 
One particular issue of concern is responding to the phenomenon of foreign (terrorist) fighters 
joining Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) or Daesh, particularly their return to their 
homelands. Both epistemic community and governments in the EU has recognized the 
complexity of responding to an entanglement between migration and terrorism in the midst of 
a strong nationalist wave that leans towards anti-immigrant voices. On the other hand, they 
also have learnt that Southeast Asian states still lack the capacity to conduct deradicalization 
and social reintegration of foreign fighters (Bos, van Ginkel and Mehra, 2018). 
Our reading of the 2007-2013 and 2013-2017 PoA’s suggest that the EU’s approach in 
conducting CT engagement with ASEAN focuses on establishing solid diplomatic relations, 
instead of actively solving terrorism problems in Southeast Asia—such as radicalizations in 
Southeast Asia communities, existence of extremist groups and terrorist organizations, as well 
as terrorism financing. To tackle those issues, the EU would need to conduct a more 
interventionist approach that might reduce the efficacy of trust-building process with the 
Southeast Asian nations who seriously take the “non-interference” principle. Additionally, 
terms used in the two PoAs are “non-binding,” which enables sincere political dialogue to occur 
rather than resolution of a certain issue on terrorism. It also appears that up until today, there 
is yet a permanently institutionalized platform that allows the EU and ASEAN to discuss the 
issue of CT. 
While the CT policy discussion between the EU and ASEAN have not yet strongly 
institutionalized, the three PoAs from their cooperation has provided a mechanism for 
cooperation in certain areas, such as law enforcement and border management. In law 
enforcement, for example, this research has analysed several EU-ASEAN documents that 
address the collaboration between the police and law enforcement agencies, including Europol, 
Aseanpol, and other provision of support for ASEAN law enforcement agencies. Europol 
usually takes the role of leadership in the cooperation between the EU and third countries, even 
though the organization does not have a broad legitimation in handling CT in the EU. The 
Europol, nevertheless, remains having the authority to find cooperation with third countries or 
international institution that deemed to be strategic partners in CT or organized crime.   
In terms of law enforcement sector, however, the EU-ASEAN cooperation lacks in 
regulating network that established by binding legal agreements. As a result, any exchange of 
information—both personal, non-personal, and technical—are conducted without any strategic 
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or operational agreement. Meanwhile, the three existing PoAs state to encourage the 
development of relations between ASEAN and EU law enforcement agencies in terms of 
sharing experiences and best practices in combating terrorism and other transnational crimes. 
The documents also urge both regions’ law enforcers to support further cooperation between 
CT institutions in the EU and ASEAN. 
Indonesia is one of the countries in ASEAN that conducted cooperation with the EU in 
the provision of police capacity building in CT. The EU assists Indonesia to establish JCLEC, 
which provides the Indonesian police trainings and educations about organized crimes, 
including money laundering and terrorism.  The EU provides Indonesia with funding to 
formulate the courses and syllabus, hire teachers and trainers, as well as conduct various 
networking activities between the EU, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam law enforcement 
agencies. While the cooperation between the EU and Indonesia grows, the EU, however, does 
not consider conducting a similar bilateral cooperation with Thailand, since the local security 
institution of Thailand allegedly committed human rights violation. 
Conversely, the EU member states also engage in a cooperation with Southeast Asia in 
the issue of CT. The EU member states also provide experts for CT trainings, seminars, and 
workshop for the SEARCCT. France, for example, ran a workshop on the relations between 
cybercrime and terrorism, money laundering, and counteracting terrorism funding; Italy 
conducted a seminar on falsifying documents and illegal immigration, while the UK held 
aviation security seminars.  
In terms of the justice sector, the EU and ASEAN cooperation centred on the issue of 
judicial assistance for extradition request. Previously, Eurojust has ratified agreements that 
allow liaison magistrates from outside EU countries to be delivered to their headquarter in The 
Hague and the other way around. However, the Eurojust did not conduct any agreement with 
ASEAN or its member countries. This is due to major differences between the EU’s standards 
to conduct cooperation and Southeast Asian countries’ justice systems. It is almost impossible 
to make a direct cooperation with any Southeast Asian countries due to several reasons: 1) The 
EU has a very strict data protection regulations while Southeast Asian countries have almost 
none, 2) Some Southeast Asian countries, have not fulfilled the perquisite to establish a judicial 
collaboration with the European Union. For example, Malaysia have not signed the 
International Convention against Torture, 3) Some legislations in Southeast Asian countries 
contradicts the right-based approach of CT that is practiced by the EU. This can be seen on 
how up until 2011, Singapore and Malaysia issued CT legislations that allow indefinite 
detention of CT suspects, and 4) Almost all countries in Southeast Asia—except for Cambodia 
and the Philippines—still implement death penalty for heavy crimes such as terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and treason. Indonesia in particular explicitly uses death penalty as a deterrence 
towards potential collaborators of terrorist networks. Therefore, the cooperation of Eurojust in 
Southeast Asia is still limited and has only been established contact points with Singapore and 
Thailand. 
While exchange of intelligence is highly encouraged between the EU-ASEAN CT 
cooperation, the three POAs do not mention any intelligence cooperation in it. Additionally, 
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there is no mention of intelligence cooperation with ASEAN nor its member states in the EU 
Country Strategy. The only cooperation between European and Southeast Asian institutions 
that includes the point of intelligence was that between the EU and Indonesia in 2009. The 
cooperation stated that the exchange of information on terrorist groups and its affiliates network 
in the framework of international and national law. However, the cooperation does not show 
any indication of inter-agency cooperation. 
Cooperation that is explicitly mentioned in the three POAs is on border and 
transportation. The border and transportation cooperation between the EU and ASEAN revolve 
around information sharing and technology that is relevant to border management and 
document security. The cooperation is implemented through Comprehensive Border 
Management Program up to 2017, in which the EU provides capacity building for ASEAN 
member states to develop an effective border management system. In addition to that, the EU 
also sponsored a pilot project by Interpol in Vietnam and Cambodia. Throughout 2009 to 2012, 
project procured modern equipment in 16 border points for a more effective border 
management between the two countries. The equipment allows both Vietnam and Cambodia 
authority to access the Interpol database which contains the latest information, therefore 
facilitating a stronger international cooperation. Up until today, this type of pilot project 
between the EU and ASEAN countries is still the only one. 
Alike to the border cooperation management that is implemented by Interpol, the EU-
ASEAN cooperation on handling terrorism financing also took place under the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). Since its inception in 1989, its main mandate is to tackle money 
laundering. However, the 9/11 played a significant role in the establishment international 
standards that allows a more affective protocol to handle money laundering. Moreover, the 
FTAF also plays the role in monitoring the compliance of countries—which previously failed 
to comply to FTAF international regulations on money laundering—to their standard through 
annual reports. Countries that are considered as non-cooperative in global effort to fight money 
laundering and terrorist financing are called Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 
(NCCTs). The NCCTs are categorized into two groups: The first one is High-Risk Non-
Cooperative States, or countries that refuse to comply with FTAF standards. The second one 
are countries that are cooperative with FATF but still need some improvement in its national 
regulations, particularly in the area of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing (CTF). Some of ASEAN member countries fall into the second category, such as 
Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam, whereas the Philippines, Brunei, and Cambodia 
have been gradually improving the implementation of international regulations even though 
they are yet to comply to AML and CTF regulations in Southeast Asia. Up to this point, 
however, there are only two countries that conducted collaborative projects with the EU to 
overcome the problem of financing terrorism activities. 
Additionally, anti-terrorism clauses are introduced by the EU in all Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The PCAs has since signed by ASEAN Countries (Indonesia 
in 2009, Philippines and Vietnam in 2010). The anti-terrorism clauses in the PCAs are directly 
refer to vital aspects of the EU’s policy preferences; for example, close cooperation with 
Interpol, joint trainings and sharing best practices with third countries. The EU, furthermore, 
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add a human rights clause, which became a reference to uphold the human rights values in the 
fight against terrorism. 
Consequently, the EU-ASEAN cooperation on CT do not target a specific terrorist 
individual and, or, organizations, but rather focus on the security and justice sector policies in 
Southeast Asian states. Through horizontal networks, capitalized by the EU, the cooperation 
allows EU to conduct policy transfers which based on its skills and experiences.  The 
cooperation seems likely to gradually strengthen, as the signing of PCAs with major ASEAN 
players has strengthened the reciprocal influence of EU to ASEAN. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The EU and ASEAN CT cooperation has not been pursued to target designated terrorist 
individuals or cells. It has rather been initiated by the EU to export their knowledge, experience 
and standards of terrorist prosecution and prevention to Southeast Asia. The EU chose to abide 
by ASEAN’s approach of regional CT policy as a complement to national policies, which 
results in a non-hierarchical nature of the transfer of experience and standards of CT policies. 
In the process, both the EU and ASEAN have obtained benefits from their CT 
cooperation. First, the EU achieves its objectives of transferring – and thereby facilitating 
capacity-building – of third countries (extra-regional states) CT, which secures its own regional 
security. This objective has so far been partially fulfilled due to the asymmetrical nature of 
security and justice governance in the EU and ASEAN. This is particularly the case on issues 
that are strongly governed by national governance, such as the implementation of death penalty 
and the governance of intelligence agencies. In addition, the impact of EU-ASEAN CT 
cooperation also lacks impact when ASEAN member-states have yet to exert control over the 
governance of particular issues, such combating terrorism-financing, where effective control 
of the state over financial transactions has not been able to curb terrorism-financing. 
Overall, the EU sustains CT cooperation with ASEAN because of three main reasons. 
First, there has been a build-up of common security conception between the EU and ASEAN 
since the late 1990’s through interregional response to emerging threats and risks due to the 
acceleration of globalization. In this regard, notions of comprehensive security and later on 
Non-Traditional Security frame the two regions’ approach towards security issues, including 
terrorism. Second, the EU finds terrorism as a suitable issue to frame its presence in one of 
Southeast Asia’s strategic security areas; Europe finds that terrorism serves as an issue of 
common ground for its security cooperation approach – instead of alliance building – and 
Southeast Asia’s pursuit for regional resilience.  
The Plans of Actions between ASEAN and the EU are mostly implemented through 
bilateral cooperation between the EU and members of ASEAN, indicating the differentiation 
of actorness between ASEAN and member states: ASEAN performs as a forum for cooperation 
framework formulation and member-states – together with the EU – as resource allocators and 
executing agencies. In such fashion, ASEAN member-states are capable of choosing the field 
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of cooperation that best suits their needs and limitation in regard to fighting terrorism. In 
addition, the EU-ASEAN CT cooperation also incorporates UN Security Council Resolution 
to shape its future accomplishments. Although stopping short of targeting of terrorism, the EU-
ASEAN CT cooperation strengthens the capacity of ASEAN member states’ conduct of pursuit 
and prosecution of terrorist suspects. In addition, EU’s prioritization of border and cyberspace 
management also drives Southeast Asian states to prioritize the avoidance of terrorists’ 
exploitation of digital information network and national borders. 
Further research is required to examine the extent to which EU’s security governance 
is diffused, localized, and/or debated in ASEAN and its member states and vice-versa. In 
addition, local non-state actors are also highly active in both regions in conducting peace 
activism, deradicalization and social re-integration of former terrorists and combatants; it 
would be interesting to measure the extent to which they shape interregional CT cooperation 
between EU and ASEAN.  
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